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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the change in earnings predictability 
of U.S. multinational companies (MNCs) following implementation of Statement 
of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131 (SFAS 131). SFAS 131 has a notice- 
able effect on the disclosure of MNCs’ geographic operations. MNCs that define 
their primary (or operating) segments on any basis other than geographic area 
are no longer required to disclose earnings by geographic area. Because most 
MNCs define operating segments along lines of business, geographic earnings 
are no longer disclosed for many firms. For example, Herrmann and Thomas 
(2000) find that only 16.2 percent of their sample companies continue to provide 
earnings by geographic area after adopting SFAS 131. Similarly, we find that 
adoption of SFAS 131 has significantly reduced the reporting of geographic earn- 
ings with our larger sample. In this paper, we are interested in determining 
whether nondisclosure of geographic earnings after implementation of SFAS 13 1 
is associated with a decrease in the predictability of MNCs’ earnings. 
We focus on earnings predictability for several reasons. First, an explicit 
objective of SFAS 131 is to help users of financial statements “better assess its 
[the enterprise’s] prospects for future cash flows” (FASB [1997], para. 3). It is 
possible that that SFAS 131 may reduce earnings predictability by no longer 
requiring the disclosure of geographic earnings for many firms. If business fac- 
tors such as profit margins and growth opportunities differ across geographic 
areas and this information is not readily available from other sources, then non- 
disclosure of geographic earnings could impair the ability of financial statement 
users to predict overall earnings. These findings will be important to the Finan- 
cial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), which places primary emphasis on the 
predictive value of financial accounting information in Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts No. 2 (FASB [1980]). 
Second, investors consider earnings predictability when making their invest- 
ment decisions. Investors have strong economic incentives to predict earnings, as 
changes in earnings positively relate to changes in firm value (Ball & Brown 
[ 19681). Earnings uncertainty, however, negatively affects the extent to which 
investors respond to announced earnings (Imhoff & Lob0 [1992]) and increases 
the information asymmetry in the market, leading to increased adverse selection 
cost of the bid-ask spread (Affleck-Graves, Callahan, & Chipalkatti [2002]). 
Consistent with prior literature, we make the assumption that better disclosure of 
financial accounting information reduces uncertainty regarding future operations, 
allowing for more accurate earnings forecasts. In fact, it seems that only for the 
occurrence of misleading or fraudulent disclosures would additional disclosure 
actually worsen users’ ability to predict earnings. Several prior studies consider 
the impact that disclosure quality has on the ability of financial statement users 
to predict earnings (e.g., Lang & Lundholm [1996]; Barron, Kile, & O’Keefe 
[1999]; Healy, Hutton, & Palepu [1999]; Gelb & Zarowin [2002]; Lundholm & 
Myers [2002]; Hope [2003a]). Our study is motivated in a similar vein. 
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Third, managers may also be concerned with earnings predictability. Most 
theoretical asset valuation models suggest that the value of an asset is inversely 
related to uncertainty with respect to future economic benefits expected from the 
asset (Kwon [2002]). Poor disclosure that reduces earnings predictability could 
therefore negatively affect the value of the firm through reduced investor follow- 
ing, increased estimation risk, and increased information asymmetry; each of 
which increases the firm’s cost of capital (Barry & Brown [1985]; Glosten & 
Milgrom [1985]; Merton [1987]). To attain a lower cost of equity capital, manag- 
ers have incentives to improve earnings predictability (Affleck-Graves, Callahan, 
& Chipalkatti [2002]). 
Finally, earnings predictability may be desired by financial analysts. Finan- 
cial analysts could incur a number of potential costs by following firms with less 
predictable earnings. First, increased research expenditures (i.e., staff hours for 
information gathering and processing) could be a direct cost of predicting earn- 
ings for the firms with low earnings predictability. Second, a less direct cost is 
the reduced information intermediary role of the analysts. The earnings forecasts 
for firms with low earnings predictability may contain more biases or errors, 
which undermines the trust of investors. Prior research (e.g., Das, Levine, & 
Sivaramakrishnan [1998]; Duru and Reeb [2002]) suggests that as earnings 
become less predictable, analysts issue increasingly optimistic forecasts to please 
managers and consequently gain, or at least limit the loss of, access to managers’ 
private information. Assuming that the market is efficient and investors can see 
through the forecast bias, analysts could risk their reputation among their clients 
for making overly optimistic forecasts. The third potential cost can occur because 
of the analyst affiliation with brokerage firms. These affiliated brokerage firms 
may reap fewer profits from their clients because investors lose confidence in the 
financial analysts and choose to hire other brokerage firms. 
Understanding the impact of geographic disclosures becomes increasingly im- 
portant as foreign operations represent a growing portion of most U.S. MNCs. 
Firms in the S&P 500 currently generate approximately 25 percent of their reve- 
nues through foreign operations. Of the ten largest U.S. companies listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), nearly one-half of their revenues are gener- 
ated from foreign operations (Meek and Thomas [2004]). Because risks and growth 
opportunities differ considerably around the world, information concerning the ori- 
gin of earnings should factor into predictions of the f m ’ s  overall earnings. Nondi- 
sclosure of geographic earnings following implementation of SFAS 131 may 
hamper the ability of financial statement users to predict MNCs’ earnings. If newly 
implemented disclosure standards are associated with a decline in useful informa- 
tion for decision making, standard setters may wish to amend current requirements. 
The FASB’s decision to no longer require disclosure of geographic earnings 
for secondary segments relates to concerns over the negative effects of the 
expected increase in business segment disclosures. Many preparer firms com- 
plained in their comment letters to the FASB’s exposure draft that implementa- 
tion of SFAS 131 would significantly increase the number of operating segments 
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being disclosed and increase the number of data items per operating segment, 
leading to higher proprietary costs (Herrmann & Thomas [1997]). As a result of 
the expected increase in reporting requirements for primary segments, the FASB 
compromised by no longer requiring disclosure of earnings for secondary seg- 
ments. As discussed previously, most firms define their primary segments along 
business lines and secondary segments along geographic areas. Therefore, the 
lack of disclosure requirements for geographic earnings relates to a compromise 
by the FASB to firms that complained about the expected increase in business 
segment reporting. 
Following a long line of research, we use analysts’ forecast errors and fore- 
cast dispersion to measure earnings predictability (e.g., Ashbaugh & Pincus 
[2001]; Affleck-Graves, Callahan, & Chipalkatti [2002]; etc). We compare results 
between a sample of MNCs that no longer disclose geographic earnings with a 
sample of MNCs that continue to disclose geographic earnings before and after 
implementation of SFAS 131. We find that the adoption of SFAS 131 does not 
have a differential effect on the two groups (i.e., nondisclosure of geographic 
earnings does not hinder analysts’ ability to predict earnings). Thus, our evidence 
supports the FASB ’s decision to require less extensive secondary segment disclo- 
sures, because nondisclosure of geographic earnings does not appear to impact 
users’ ability to predict earnings.’ We conduct a number of sensitivity tests and 
find that these conclusions remain constant. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses prior research. Section 3 
details the data and our sample selection. Section 4 describes the research design 
and presents empirical results. Conclusions are offered in section 5 .  
2. Prior Research Relating Geographic Segment Disclosures to 
Earnings Predictability 
SFAS 131 fundamentally changes the way in which firms report segment in- 
formation. Before SFAS 131, SFAS 14 required firms to disclose sales, assets, 
and earnings for lines of business and geographic areas. Line of business seg- 
ments were generally disclosed along Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
codes and geographic areas were disclosed by country or region. SFAS 14 was 
referred to as the “industry approach.” Currently, SFAS 131 requires firms to 
report segment information consistent with the internal organization of the com- 
pany (e.g., products and services, geographic area, legal entity, or customer). In 
addition, firms are required to report segment results according to methods used 
for internal reporting purposes, which are not necessarily in accordance with 
1. Policy implications from our tests should be made with caution. Both public and private in- 
formation can affect earnings predictability and we do not control for private information in our tests. 
Thus, the lack of significant evidence of a change in analysts’ ability to predict earnings could be 
caused by a change in the level of private information instead of the nondisclosure of public informa- 
tion. 
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generally accepted accounting principles. The segment reporting approach of 
SFAS 131 may be superior to that under SFAS 14 because external parties can 
now “see through the eyes of management” (Street, Nichols, & Gray [2000]). 
This method of segment reporting is referred to as the “management approach” 
(FASB [1997], para. 4). 
Recent research suggests that implementation of SFAS 131 results in more 
segments being disclosed (Herrmann and Thomas [2000]; Street, Nichols, & Gray 
[2000]), more information per segment being disclosed (Herrmann & Thomas 
[2000]), greater precision in analysts’ forecasts (Berger & Hann [2003]), and 
greater ability of investors to predict earnings (Ettredge, Kwon, Smith, & 
Zarowin [2005]). These studies typically focus on disclosure of business segments. 
Another effect of the implementation of SFAS 131 is the reduction in the informa- 
tion disclosed for each geographic segment. Firms that choose to define their oper- 
ating segments on any basis other than geographic area (e.g., products and 
services) are no longer required to disclose geographic earnings information. These 
f m s ,  however, must continue to report geographic sales and long-lived assets. 
Herrmann and Thomas (2000) find that most MNCs define operating segments 
along products and services and therefore no longer disclose geographic earnings 
information. The issue then becomes whether the loss of geographic earnings dis- 
closure relates to a decrease in the predictability of MNCs’ earnings Because earn- 
ings predictability relates to the overall variability and expected growth of 
consolidated earnings, it seems reasonable that investors would consider the differ- 
ential variability and growth of geographic earnings. Clearly, geographic areas 
around the world differ in levels of uncertainty and growth and should differen- 
tially affect earnings forecasts. 
Prior research provides evidence of the usefulness of geographic disclosures to 
predict earnings under SFAS 14. Ahadiat (1993) employs Box-Jenkins time series 
models over a nineteen-year period and finds that geographic segment earnings 
provide more accurate predictions of consolidated earnings than do consolidated 
earnings alone. Similarly, Balakrishnan, Harris, and Sen (1990) fiid that geo- 
graphic earnings can improve the predictability of consolidated earnings under cer- 
tain conditions. Nichols, Tunnell, and Seipel (1995) report that the earnings 
forecast accuracy of financial analysts improved after implementation of SFAS 14. 
Other studies provide indirect evidence of the potential usefulness of geo- 
graphic segments to predict earnings. Senteney and Bazaz (1992) show that the 
relation between abnormal returns and the change in earnings at the time earn- 
ings are announced decreases after implementation of SFAS 14. This result sug- 
gests that the market is able to make more accurate predictions of future 
consolidated earnings by using geographic segment data (i.e., there are fewer sur- 
prises at the time earnings are announced). Thomas (2000) provides evidence of 
differential market valuations of geographic earnings, suggesting that investors 
consider geographic earnings in setting firm value. The valuation multiples on 
geographic earnings correlate positively with the geographic segment’s growth 
and negatively with the geographic segment’s risk. These results are consistent 
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with the ability of risk and growth to explain differences in valuation multiples 
of total earnings (Kormendi & Lipe [1987]; Collins & Kothari [1989]).* 
While the studies mentioned thus far find evidence consistent with the 
potential usefulness of geographic earnings in predicting consolidated earnings, 
Boatsman, Behn, and Patz (1993) find conflicting results. They investigate the 
use of geographic earnings by investors and examine the market reaction to 
unexpected geographic earnings at the release of the firm’s Form 10-K. If inves- 
tors use geographic earnings disclosures, then unexpected geographic earnings 
should be valued differentially; otherwise consolidated earnings are sufficient. 
Boatsman, Behn, and Patz (1993) find that unexpected geographic earnings gen- 
erally are not differentially related to unexpected security returns, suggesting that 
either investors do not use this information or they obtain it from other sources 
(e.g., geographic sales, news sources, company announcements, e t ~ . ) . ~  Their 
event study approach does not speak directly to the issue of earnings predictabil- 
ity. Our study is the first attempt to measure directly (using analysts’ forecasts) 
the usefulness of geographic earnings to predict consolidated earnings. 
As discussed in more detail below, we examine earnings predictability using 
analysts’ forecast error and forecast dispersion. Both of these metrics have been 
used extensively in prior research to measure the predictability of earnings. In their 
role as information intermediaries, analysts incur significant costs in gathering and 
processing information to predict earnings accurately because of the clear eco- 
nomic incentives for doing so. If the information set used by analysts includes geo- 
graphic earnings disclosures, then nondisclosure of geographic earnings after 
implementation of SFAS 13 1 should negatively affect earnings predictability. 
3. Data and Sample 
To determine the impact that implementation of SFAS 131 has on earnings 
predictability, it is important that we correctly identify the pre- and post-SFAS 
13 1 periods. Initial implementation of SFAS 13 1 would affect the predictability 
of earnings in the following period. It is the previous year’s geographic disclo- 
sures (or lack thereof) that will affect the predictability of current earnings. 
SFAS 131 became effective for periods ending after December 15, 1998. There- 
fore, we define the post-SFAS 131 period as the one-year period subsequent 
2. In a related study, Bodnar and Weintrop (1997) find that the market’s valuation of foreign 
earnings is greater than the market’s valuation of domestic earnings. They attribute this finding to the 
greater growth opportunities associated with foreign operations. 
3. Early descriptive studies criticize the disclosure of geographic segment data under SFAS 14 
(e.g., Arnold. Holder, & Mann [1980]; Bavishi & Wyman [1980]; Doupnik & Rolfe [1990]). The fi- 
nancial community also criticizes disclosures of geographic segment data (AIh4R [1993], 39; AICPA 
[1994]). Many complain that geographic segment earnings disclosures are not useful because of insuf- 
ficient disaggregation, lack of comparability across firms, and management manipulation through 
transfer pricing policies and common cost allocations. See Pacter (1993) for a thorough discussion of 
the alleged shortcomings of segment reporting practices under SFAS 14 and Henmann and Thomas 
(1998) for a review of the literature in this area. 
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FIGURE 1 
Pre- and Post-SFAS 131 Periods 
Initial 
Pre-SFAS 131 Implementation Post-SFAS 13 1 
Period of SFAS 131 Period 
t 1 I I I 
1997 1998 1999 2000 
Pre-SFAS 131 Period = Fiscal year ends from December 1997 to November 1998. 
Initial Implementation = Fiscal year ends from December 1998 to November 1999. 
Post-SFAS 131 Period = Fiscal year ends from December 1999 to November 2000. 
to the year of initial implementation, which includes firms with year ends from 
December 1999 to November 2000. The pre-SFAS 131 period is the one-year 
period before implementation of SFAS 131, which includes firms with year-ends 
from December 1997 to November 1998. Fiscal year ends between December 
1998 and November 1999 are excluded from our analysis because this is the year 
following possible early adoption of SFAS 131. Figure 1 provides a graphical 
depiction of the pre- and post-SFAS 131 periods: 
Table 1 outlines the sampling criteria. The initial sample includes all U.S. 
incorporated MNCs that disclose geographic sales for at least one year in both 
the pre-SFAS 131 period and post-SFAS 131 period. This results in 1,554 firms. 
Firms are then required to have disclosed geographic earnings in the pre-SFAS 
131 period so that the effects of discontinuing disclosure can be measured. This 
reduces the sample by 218 observations. Next, we require that all sample firms 
generate an average of 10 percent of their sales from foreign operations in both 
the pre- and post-SFAS 131 period. The effect of nondisclosure of geographic 
earnings should occur primarily for firms with significant foreign  operation^.^ 
This criterion results in 227 firms being eliminated. We also require that Institu- 
tional Brokers Estimate System (UB/E/S) forecast data be available for both the 
pre- and post-SFAS 131 period, which eliminates an additional 407 firms from 
our sample. Finally, we eliminate a firm if its absolute analyst forecast error in 
4. The effect of nondisclosure of geographic earnings may not be concentrated in the year im- 
mediately before and the year after implementation to SFAS 131. While including only one year in 
the pre- and post-SFAS periods increases the internal validity of our tests, it reduces the number of 
observations and the power of our tests. As a robustness check, we extend the pre-SFAS period to 
three years leading up to adoption of SFAS 131 and the post-SFAS period to three years following. 
These results are similar to those reported. 
5. The 10 percent criterion is consistent with the 10 percent criterion established by SFAS 14 
whereby firms are not required to disclose geographic segment information unless foreign sales or 
foreign assets include at least 10 percent of consolidated amounts. Results are not sensitive to this 
criterion. We also considered dropping this criterion and keeping all observations or requiring foreign 
sales to be at least 20 percent of total sales. Results are similar to those reported and none of the con- 
clusions changes. 
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TABLE 1 
Determination of Final Sample 
Number of Firms 
Firms that disclose geographic sales data for both the pre-SFAS 131 period 
and post-SFAS 131 perioda 1,554 
Less: Firms that do not disclose geographic earnings in the pre-SFAS 13,l 
periodb (2 18) 
Less: Firms generating an average of less than 10% of their sales from 
foreign operations in the pre- or post-SFAS 131 period" (227) 
Less: Forecast data available from I/B/E/S eight months before the year-end 
in the pre- and post-SFAS 131 periodsd (407) 
Less: Extreme analyst forecast errorse (14) 
Final samplef 
"The sample period includes all fiscal year ends for the one-year period between December 
1997 and November 1998 (pre-SFAS 131 period) and the one-year period between December 1999 
and November 2000 (post-SFAS 131 period). 
%is criterion ensures that all sample observations had disclosure of geographic earnings in the 
pre-SFAS 131 period so that the effects of nondisclosure of geographic earnings in the post-SFAS 
131 period can be determined. 
'This criterion ensures that foreign operations are material and nondisclosure has the potential 
to affect overall earnings predictability. 
dWe measure absolute forecast error as actual earnings minus the consensus forecast in the eight 
months preceding the fiscal year end, scaled by price at the time of the forecast. 
delete the highest percentile of absolute forecast error. To maintain our matched sample 
in the pre- and post-SFAS 131 periods, an extreme observation deleted in the pre- (post-) SFAS 131 
period will cause the firm's observations to be deleted in the post- (pre-) SFAS 131 period. 
fFor our tests of forecast dispersion, we require three analysts to be included in the consensus 
as of eight months before year-end. This criterion reduces the forecast dispersion sample to 540 
firms. 
the pre- or post-SFAS 131 period falls in the top percentile. The final sample 
includes 688 firms. 
In Table 2, we provide mean amounts for a number of variables related to 
MNCs and their disclosure of geographic operations. The amounts are partitioned 
so that comparisons can be made in the pre- versus post-SFAS 131 period for 
those firms that continue to disclose geographic earnings versus those that no 
longer disclose. As will be discussed in more detail below, some of these varia- 
bles may relate to analysts' forecasts and therefore could affect conclusions. We 
include these variables as controls in our model. 
Of the 688 firms in the sample, 509 (74 percent) no longer disclose geo- 
graphic earnings after implementation of SFAS 13 1. For both disclosers and non- 
disclosers of geographic earnings in the post-SFAS 131 period, the number of 
industry segments disclosed (ZNDSEGS) significantly increased after implementa- 
tion of SFAS 131. Both disclosers and nondisclosers also had a significant 
increase in the number of foreign geographic segments (GEOSEGS) after 
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TABLE 2 
Means and Sample Sizes 
Firms that disclose geographic 
earnings in the post-SFAS 
Firms that do not disclose 
geographic earnings in the 
131 period Post-SFAS 131 period Variables and 
sample size' All he-131 Post- 13 1 Pre-131 Post- 13 1 
Findyears 
INDSEGS 
GEOSEGS 
LGMV 
NUMEST 
SEGSALES 
TOTSALES 
TOTASSETS 
MKTBOOK 
FORPCT 
AFE (x 100) 
Findyearsb 
DISP (x 100) 
1,376 
2.193 
2.258 
20.814 
10.062 
20.708 
20.724 
20.749 
3.940 
0.363 
1.945 
0.434 
1.080 
179 
1.637 
2.201 
20.591 
9.899 
20.45 1 
20.473 
20.482 
4.233 
0.376 
1.622 
0.446 
138 
179 
2.525'** 
2.760"' 
20.7 13 
10.609 
20.613 
20.759 
20.722 
4.453 
0.407 
2.306** 
0.532 
138 
509 
1.644 
1.849 
20.797 
9.758 
20.680 
20.664 
20.713 
3.829 
0.334 
1.507 
0.375 
402 
509 
2.821'*' 
2.511*** 
20.945 
10.230 
20.859% 
20.877* 
20.941"' 
3.766 
0.372**" 
2.371*'* 
0.455' 
402 
'INDSEGS is the number industry segments reported by the firm, GEOSEGS is the number of foreign geo- 
graphic segments repotted by the fm, LGMV is the log of market value, NUMEST is the number of analysts 
included in the consensus forecast eight months before the year-end, SEGSALES is the sum of geographic seg- 
ment sales, TOTSALES is total consolidated sales, TOTMSETS is total consolidated assets, MKTBOOK is the ra- 
tio of market value equity to book value of equity, FORPCT is the percentage of annual foreign sales to total 
geographic segment sales, AFE is the absolute forecast emr  measumi as earnings per share in year t minw the 
consensus forecast eight months before the year-end, scaled by price at the time of the forecast, DISP equals the 
standad deviation of analysts' forecasts of earnings per share eight months before the end of year t ,  scaled by 
price at the time of the consensus forecast. 
bSample sizes are smaller because of the additional data requirement that firms have at least 
three analysts providing forecasts eight months before year-end. 
Indicates that the mean for the pre-SFAS 131 period is significantly different at the 
10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, from the mean for the post-SFAS 131 
*/**/**" 
period. 
implementation of SFAS 13 1 .6 Disclosers of geographic earnings also have 
slightly lower total geographic segment sales (SEGSALES), total sales (TOT- 
SALES), and total assets (TOTASSETS), but a higher ratio of foreign sales to total 
geographic sales (FORPCT) compared with nondisclosers. Neither group had a 
significant change in the mean market-to-book ratio (MKTBOOK). 
6. The increase in the number of geographic segments could offset any loss of information 
related to nondisclosure of geographic earnings. In the Additional Tests section, we divide the sample 
into those firms that have increased the number of geographic segments after implementation of 
SFAS 131 and those that did not. We find no evidence of a relation between nondisclosure and eam- 
ings predictability for either group. There does not appear to be an offsetting effect between the 
increase in number of geographic segments and the decrease in information (i.e., earnings) disclosed 
per segment. 
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016jaf.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
332 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING, AUDITING & FINANCE 
Table 2 also reports mean amounts for each of the dependent variables being 
tested: analysts’ absolute forecast errors (ME) and analysts’ forecast dispersion 
(DZSP). The sample size for tests of DZSP is lower because of the additional data 
requirement that f m s  have at least three analysts included in the consensus fore- 
casts to make the calculation of the standard deviation meaningful. Both disclosers 
and nondisclosers have a significant increase in AFE and DISP after implementa- 
tion of SFAS 131. The increase in each of these variables is approximately equal 
for disclosers and nondisclosers. While these increases for nondisclosers are consist- 
ent with declining earnings predictability, conclusions are confounded by the fact 
that this same declining earnings predictability is observed for the firms that con- 
tinue to disclose geographic earnings. This makes it difficult to attribute the declin- 
ing earnings predictability to nondisclosure of geographic earnings. 
4. Results 
4.1 Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy 
We first examine the effect of disclosure versus nondisclosure of geographic 
earnings on analysts’ forecast accuracy. Our use of analysts’ forecasts to measure 
earnings predictability is motivated by the following. Analysts’ forecasts provide 
observable measures of earnings expectations by sophisticated users of financial 
accounting information. Presumably, analysts have economic incentives to accu- 
rately forecast earnings, and they actively employ their resources and skills in 
outperforming their peers. Other measures of earnings predictability (e.g., me- 
chanical time-series model) generally do not outperform analysts and do not 
incorporate disclosure information. In fact, the superiority of analysts over me- 
chanical models likely relates to analysts’ use of a more complete information 
set that includes disclosure information. 
A long line of research uses analysts’ absolute forecast error as a measure of 
earnings predictability (e.g., Elliott & Philbrick [ 19901; Luttman & Silhan 
[1995]; Lang & Lundholm [1996]; Barron, Kile, & O’Keefe [1999]; Ashbaugh 
& Pincus [2001]; Affleck-Graves, Callahan, & Chipalkatti [2002]; Bowen, Davis, 
& Matsumoto [2002]; Hope [2003a]; and many others). In general, this research 
shows that analysts’ forecasts are typically less accurate for firms with lower 
quality disclosures. If analysts employ disclosures of geographic earnings in for- 
mulating a forecast of earnings, then nondisclosure of such information should 
decrease their forecast accuracy. 
To test the impact of nondisclosure of geographic earnings on analysts’ fore- 
casts, we consider two research designs: 
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016jaf.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
NONDISCLOSURE OF GEOGRAPHIC SEGMENT EARNINGS 333 
AFE is analysts’ absolute forecast, which equals actual earnings as reported 
by VB/E/S minus the consensus forecast eight months before year-end (scaled by 
price at the time of the foreca~t).~ POST and NONDZSC are indicator variables 
for the post-SFAS 131 period and for firms that no longer disclose geographic 
earnings in the post-SFAS 131 period, respectively. For the time-series research 
design, eq. (l), the change in AFE from the pre- to post-SFAS 131 period for 
firms that no longer disclose geographic earnings after implementation of SFAS 
131 (nondisclosers). The change in AFE is measured by al, controlling for other 
firm characteristics that vary over the pre- and post-SFAS 131 time periods. As a 
control sample, we then estimate al for firms that continue to disclose geo- 
graphic earnings after implementation (disclosers). We test whether a1 of nondi- 
sclosers is significantly different from a1 of disclosers. Evidence of reduced 
earnings predictability would be provided if 01 of nondisclosers is greater than 
a1 of disclosers. 
For the cross-sectional research design, eq. (2), we measure the difference in 
AFE between disclosers and nondisclosers in the post-SFAS 131 period. The dif- 
ference between the two groups is measured by P I ,  controlling for cross-sectional 
differences in f i i  characteristics. We then estimate PI in the pre-SFAS 131 pe- 
riod between these two groups. Thus, the pre-SFAS 131 period acts as the con- 
trol period in our cross-sectional analysis by testing for differences between 
these two groups when all firms disclose geographic earnings. 
While both eq. (1) and eq. (2) are similar in their “differences-in-differen- 
ces” research design, each offers an advantage over the other. Eq. (1) has the 
advantage of controlling for changes in firm-specific characteristics around the 
implementation of SFAS 131. This provides greater reliability that any changes 
in analysts’ forecast errors are attributable to the implementation of SFAS 131 
rather than to changes in other firm characteristics. Eq. (2) has the advantage of 
controlling for differences in firm characteristics between disclosers and nondi- 
sclosers. Firms that choose to disclose geographic earnings may differ in some 
way from firms that choose not to disclose, and it may be this difference, rather 
than nondisclosure of geographic earnings, that affects analysts’ forecasts. 
The remaining variables in the model are specifically chosen to control for 
firm Characteristics that are expected to relate to analysts’ forecast accuracy for 
our sample of firms. We are interested in the impact of SFAS 131 beyond any 
other factors shown to be related to forecast accuracy. Controlling for firm size 
has become standard procedure (e.g.. Lang & Lundhom [1993]; Lang & 
Lundholm [1996]; Barron, Kile, & O’Keefe [1999]; Healy, Hutton, & Palepu 
[1999]; Ashbaugh & Pincus [2001]; Hope [2003a]). Larger firms have more pre- 
dictable earnings because of a better overall information environment and a more 
stable earnings stream. We use the log of market value (LGMV) at the time of 
the forecast to measure firm size. While highly correlated with firm size, we also 
7. As in Payne and Thomas (2003). we use the unadjusted I/B/E/S data and appropriately adjust 
for stock splits. 
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include the number of analysts following the firm (NUMEST) at the time of the 
forecast. Analyst following may have some incremental ability to explain fore- 
cast accuracy if it represents competition among analysts (Lys & So0 [1995]). 
As competition increases, forecast accuracy should increase. Moreover, firms’ 
nondisclosure of geographic earnings may potentially affect the number of ana- 
lysts following the firm. Therefore, it is important for us to include this number. 
We also control for loss firms (LOSS) with an indicator variable (Heflin, 
Subramanyam, & Zhang [2003]; Hope [2003a]). Analysts’ forecasts are expected 
to be less accurate for loss firms (Brown [2001]). This occurs because of the 
greater overall uncertainty surrounding loss firms and the transitory nature of 
negative earnings, making it inherently more difficult to predict earnings. In 
addition, analysts’ incentives to gather and process information to make accurate 
earnings predictions are reduced, as loss firms are less likely to generate trading 
revenue for the brokerage firm. Because the frequency of loss firms has been 
increasing over time, failure to control for this factor in a pre- versus post-SFAS 
131 test could impact conclusions. 
We also consider that firm complexity can affect earnings predictability. 
More complex firms necessitate a higher degree of ability and information proc- 
essing to predict earnings accurately. Following Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy, 
and Raghunandan (2004), we use the number of industry segments (ZNDSEGS) 
and the ratio of foreign sales to total geographic segment sales (FORPCT) to rep- 
resent the complexity of the firm.* Both of these variables are expected to relate 
positively to analysts’ absolute forecast errors. 
One limitation of our study is that we do not control for all variables that 
affect analysts’ forecast errors. However, using control samples in eq. (1) (i.e., 
firms that continue to disclose geographic earnings in the post-SFAS 13 1 period) 
and eq. (2) (i.e., firms in the pre-SFAS 131 period that disclose geographic earn- 
ings) helps to mitigate the potential problem of correlated omitted variables. The 
control samples provide a benchmark from which to measure the effect of nondi- 
sclosure in the post-SFAS 131 period. Another limitation of our study is that 
analysts’ forecasts may provide biased or noisy measures of earnings predictabil- 
ity. While analysts’ forecasts are useful to academic researchers because they 
provide observable measures of expected earnings from sophisticated users of fi- 
nancial accounting information, analysts’ forecasts may not always accurately 
match the earnings expectations of other users. Thus, our conclusions apply to 
investors only to the extent that analysts’ forecasts and investors’ expectations 
align. 
The results for eq. (1) are reported in Table 3. Consistent with the descrip- 
tive statistics reported in Table 2, the model for nondisclosers suggests higher 
absolute forecast errors in the post-SFAS 131 period, after controlling for other 
variables. The coefficient on POST is 0.433 ( t  = 1.98), indicating that analysts’ 
8. We also considered adding the number of geographic segments as a control variable. Doing 
so has little influence on the results and none of the conclusions changes. 
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absolute forecast errors are, on average, greater in the post-SFAS 131 period. 
This would be consistent with nondisclosure of geographic earnings reducing 
earnings predictability. However, a similar increase in absolute forecast error is 
observed for firms that continue to disclose geographic earnings. The coefficient 
on POST for these firms is 0.302 ( t  = 1.69). The differential increase between 
the two groups of 0.131 ( t  = 0.433 - 0.302) is not significant ( t  = 0.33). Thus, 
we conclude that the declining performance of analysts’ forecasts cannot be 
attributed to nondisclosure of geographic earnings. The control variables are gen- 
erally significant in the predicted direction.’ 
The results for eq. (2) are reported in Table 4. For the post-SFAS 131 pe- 
riod, the coefficient for NONDISC of 0.293 ( t  = 0.97) is positive but not signifi- 
cant. For the pre-SFAS 131 period, the coefficient on NONDISC is 0.252 ( t  = 
1.29). The insignificant coefficient suggests that in the pre-SFAS 13 1 period 
eventual nondisclosers have forecast errors similar to firms that will continue to 
disclose geographic earnings after implementation of SFAS 131. Thus, as shown 
by the difference in the coefficients, analysts’ forecast errors for nondisclosers 
are not significantly different than those of disclosers ( t  = 0.1 1). Nondisclosure 
of geographic earnings has no significant relation to differences in analysts’ fore- 
cast accuracy. 
4.2 Analysts’ Forecast Dispersion 
As an additional test, we consider whether analysts’ forecast dispersion 
changes around the implementation of SFAS 131. While tests of analysts’ fore- 
cast errors reported in the previous section are considered our primary results, 
we consider the effect of nondisclosure of geographic earnings on analysts’ fore- 
cast dispersion as a secondary test. Our rationale for its use as a measure of earn- 
ings predictability is as follows. In the absence of public disclosures (i.e., 
common information), analysts have incentives to gather uniquely private infor- 
mation (Kim [ 1993]), which increases analysts’ idiosyncratic beliefs (Barron, 
Byard, & Kim [2002]). It is the expression of idiosyncratic beliefs that leads to 
forecast dispersion. If analysts previously relied on publicly available geographic 
earnings disclosures in setting their forecasts, then nondisclosure of geographic 
earnings under SFAS 131 eliminates a useful source of common information. 
Individual analysts will gather varying amounts and precision of private informa- 
tion related to foreign operations, and forecast dispersion should increase. Elliott 
and Philbrick (1990, 168) use forecast dispersion to measure the impact of 
accounting changes on earnings predictability and explain that “ [t]o the extent 
9. Note that NUMEST is not significant in the nondiscloser model and is significantly positive 
in the discloser model. These results occur as a result of including both NUMEST and LGMV in the 
model. These variables are highly positively correlated. When LGMV is removed from the model, 
NUMEST is significantly negatively related to AFE for disclosers and nondisclosers. 
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TABLE 3 
Time-Series Analysis: Impact of SFAS 131 on Analysts' Absolute Forecast 
Errorsa 
AFE;,Z (X 100) = r ~ o  + CY,POST;,Z + CXZLGMV;,Z + a;lNUMESTi,, + ~w&OSS;,Z + CY~INDSEGS;,, + 
CY,$ORPCT~,~ + E ; , ~  
Variablesb Pred. Nondisclosers Disclosers Difference" 
Intercept 11.127 12.906 - 1.779 
(6.04)*** (5.34)"' (-0.53) 
POST + 0.433 0.302 0.131 
(1.98)" (1.69)' (0.33) 
LGMV - -0.538 -0.655 0.117 
(-5.53)"' (-5.00)*'* (0.66) 
NUMEST - 0.019 0.064 -0.045 
(0.96) (2.28)" (- 1.19) 
LOSS + 8.091 6.497 1.594 
INDSEGS + 0.180 0.300 -0.120 
(1.98)" (2.50)" (-0.73) 
FORPCT + 1.768 1.348 0.420 
(2.95)"' (1.93)' (0.42) 
(21.30)"' (13.50)"' (2.38)" 
Adj R-Square 
N 
0.409 0.480 
1,018 358 
"Separate regressions are provided for firms that no longer disclose (nondisclosers) and those 
that continue to disclose (disclosers) geographic earnings in the post-SFAS 13 1 period. The pre-SFAS 
131 period includes all annual observations of firms with year-ends from December 1997 to Novem- 
ber 1998. The post-SFAS 131 period includes all annual observations of firms with year-ends from 
December 1999 to November 2000. 
bAFE is the absolute forecast error measured as earnings per share in year t minus the consensus 
forecast eight months before the year-end, scaled by price at the time of the forecast. POST is an in- 
dicator variable equal to 1 (0) for the post- (pre-) SFAS 131 period. LGMV is the log of market 
value. NUMEST is the number of analysts included in the consensus forecast eight months before the 
year-end. LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) if actual earnings as reported by 
vB/E/S are less than zero. INDSEGS is the number of industry segments reported by the firm. FORPCT 
is the percentage of annual foreign sales to total geographic segment sales. 
'The significance of the difference in mean coefficients is tested using the typical F-test. 
*/**/*** 
Indicates significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively 
(&statistics and F-statistics are shown in parentheses). 
that accounting changes make it more difficult to forecast earnings, the individ- 
ual forecasts of different analysts are expected to be more dispersed in years of 
accounting changes." Several other studies employ forecast dispersion to 
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TABLE 4 
Cross-Sectional Analysis: Impact of Nondisclosure of Geographic Earnings 
on Analysts' Absolute Forecast Errorsa 
AFEi,, (X 100) = Po + PINON DISC^,, + &LGMVi,, + P3NUMESTi.t + p4LOSSi,t + P5INDSEGSi,t + 
P$ORPCT,,t + Q,, 
Variablesb Red. Post-SFAS 131 Pre-SFAS 131 Difference' 
Intercept 13.777 8.191 5.586 
(5.83)"' (4.86)"' (1.89)' 
NONDISC + 0.293 0.252 0.041 
(0.97) (1.29) (0.11) 
LGMV - -0.669 -0.403 -0.266 
(-5.30)"' (-4.46)"' (-1.68)* 
NUMEST - 0.027 0.028 -0.001 
(1.01) (1.56) (-0.02) 
LOSS + 8.330 6.549 1.78 1 
(17.40)"' (18.55)"' (2.91)"* 
(3.04)*** (0.27) (2.37)" 
INDSEGS i 0.370 0.021 0.349 
FORPCT + 0.697 2.218 -1.521 
(0.91) (4.33)"' (- 1.64) 
Adj R-Square 
N 
0.423 0.428 
688 688 
"Separate regression are provided for the pre- and post-SFAS 131 periods. The pre-SFAS 131 
period includes all annual observations of firms with year-ends from December 1997 to November 
1998. The post-SFAS 131 period includes all annual observations of firms with year-ends from 
December 1999 to November 2000. 
bAFE is the absolute forecast error measured as earnings per share in year r minus the consensus 
forecast eight months before the year-end, scaled by price at the time of the forecast. NONDISC is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for firms that do not disclose geographic earnings in the 
post-SFAS 131 period. LGMV is the log of market value. NUMEST is the number of analysts 
included in the consensus forecast eight months before the year-end. LOSS is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 (0 otherwise) if actual earnings as reported by I/J3/E/S are less than zero. INDSEGS is the 
number industry segments reported by the firm. FORPCT is the percentage of annual foreign sales to 
total geographic segment sales. 
'The significance of the difference in mean coefficients is tested using the typical F-test. 
*/**/*.. Indicates significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively 
(r-statistics and F-statistics are shown in parentheses). 
measure uncertainty surrounding future earnings (e.g., Imhoff & Lob0 [ 19921; 
Francis, Hanna, & Philbrick [1997]; Barron, Kile, & O'Keefe [1999]; Affleck- 
Graves, Callahan, & Chipalkatti [2002]; Bowen, Davis, & Matsumoto [2002]; 
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Clement, Frankel & Miller [2003]; Hope [2003b])." To test the impact of non- 
disclosure of geographic earnings on forecast dispersion, we employ our time- 
series Equation (3) and cross-sectional Equation (4) research designs. 
DISP equals the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts of earnings per 
share eight months before the end of year t, scaled by price at the time of 
the consensus forecast. All other variables are as previously defined, including 
the control variables. For eq. (3), POST measures the change in dispersion 
around implementation of SFAS 131. For eq. (4), NONDISC measures the dif- 
ference in dispersion between nondisclosers and disclosers of geographic earn- 
ings. If nondisclosure of geographic earnings results in greater forecast 
dispersion, then POST and NONDISC will be positive. 
The results for eq. (3) are reported in Table 5. The coefficient on POST for 
nondisclosers is not significant ( t  = -0.55). This indicates that there is no 
change in forecast dispersion once these firms discontinue their disclosures of ge- 
ographic earnings. The coefficient on POST for disclosers is also not significant 
( t  = 0.82) and neither is the difference in coefficients ( t  = -1.03). Since non- 
disclosure of geographic earnings decreases the amount of publicly available in- 
formation, it was expected that forecast dispersion would be greater for 
nondisclosers. As the access to public information decreases, analysts will share 
less common information and disagreement should increase. However, we find 
no evidence that nondisclosure of geographic earnings induces greater disagree- 
ment among analysts regarding future earnings. 
The results for eq. (4) are reported in Table 6. In the post-SFAS 13 1 period, 
the coefficient on NONDISC of -0.043 is opposite the expected direction but is 
not significant ( t  = -0.68). MNCs no longer disclosing geographic segment 
earnings after implementation of SFAS 131 show no indication of significantly 
greater disagreement among analysts than do MNCs that continue to disclose ge- 
ographic earnings. In the pre-SFAS 131 period, the coefficient on NONDISC of 
-0.009 ( t  = -0.19) indicates that the insignificant difference in dispersion 
between the two groups in the post-SFAS 131 period also exists in the pre-SFAS 
131 period. The difference in the NONDISC coefficients from the pre-to post- 
SFAS 131 period is also insignificant ( t  = -0.43). We conclude that 
10. Dispersion in analysts' forecasts can be a function of differences in the information set 
available to analysts as well as differences in forecasting models. In practice, however, it is generally 
not possible to quantify the differences in forecasting models, because analysts do not publish their 
models and procedures of how to forecast earnings. Thus, all we can obtain from public sources are 
the forecasted eamings-the final results from analysts. 
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TABLE 5 
Time-Series Analysis: Impact of SFAS 131 on Analysts' Forecast Dispersion" 
DISP,,, (X 100) = (YO + CZ~POST,,, + CX~LGMV,,, + (Y~NUMEST,,, + CZ~LOSS,,, + CZ~INDSEGS,,, 
+ (Y~FORPCT,,, + E,,, 
Variablesb Red. Nondisclosers Disclosers Difference' 
Intercept 3.383 4.590 - 1.207 
(8.36)"" (6.94)*** (- 1.62) 
POST + -0.024 0.064 -0.088 
(-0.55) (0.82) (-1.03) 
LGMV - -0.163 -0.225 0.062 
(-7.79)'- (-6.30)*** ( 1.54) 
NUMEST + 0.018 0.036 -0.018 
LOSS + 1.47 1 1.475 -0.004 
INDSEGS + 0.061 0.029 0.032 
(3.45)"" (0.96) (0.95) 
FORPCT + 0.306 0.091 0.215 
(2.48)'" (0.46) (0.96) 
Adj R-Square 0.340 0.373 
N 804 276 
(4.57)"' (4.92)**' (-2.32)** 
(15.68)*'* (8.43)*** (-0.02) 
aSeparate regressions are provided for firms that no longer disclose (nondisclosers) and those 
that continue to disclose (disclosers) geographic earnings in the post-SFAS 131 period. The pre-SFAS 
131 period includes all annual observations of firms with year-ends from December 1997 to Novem- 
ber 1998. The post-SFAS 131 period includes all annual observations of firms with year-ends from 
December 1999 to November 2000. 
bDISP equals the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts of earnings per share eight months 
before the end of year t ,  scaled by price at the time of the consensus forecast. POST is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 (0) for the post- (pre-) SFAS 131 period. LGMV is the log of market value. NUM- 
EST is the number of analysts included in the consensus forecast eight months before the year-end. 
LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) if actual earnings as reported by I/B/E/S are 
less than zero. INDSEGS is the number industry segments reported by the firm. FORPCT is the per- 
centage of annual foreign sales to total geographic segment sales. 
'The significance of the difference in mean coefficients is tested using the typical F-test. 
*/**I*** Indicates significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively 
(&statistics and F-statistics are shown in parentheses). 
nondisclosure of geographic earnings has not affected the predictability of 
MNCs' earnings, as measured using analysts' forecast dispersion. 
4.3 Additional Tests 
The results reported to this point rely on a full sample of MNCs meeting the 
necessary sampling criteria. In this section, we explore subsets of firms for which 
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016jaf.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
340 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING, AUDITING & FINANCE 
TABLE 6 
Cross-Sectional Analysis: Impact of Nondisclosure of Geographic Earnings 
on Analysts' Forecast Dispersion" 
DISP,, ( X  100) : Po + PINON DISC^,^ + PzLGMV + P3NUMESTi.t + P&OSSit + PsINDSEGSi,, 
P8ORPCTi,t + ~ i , r  
Variablesb Pred. Post-SFAS 131 Pre-SFAS 131 Difference' 
Intercept 4.699 2.541 2.057 
(9.25)"' (5.91)"' (2.98)"' 
NONDISC + -0.043 -0.009 -0.034 
(-0.68) (-0.19) (-0.43) 
LGMV - -0.227 -0.124 -0.103 
(-8.49)"' (-5.26)"' (-2.83)"' 
(5.56)"' (3.49)"' (2. I,)** 
NUMEST + 0.030 0.0 15 0.015 
LOSS + 1.363 1.635 -0.272 
(1  1.22)"' (14.80)"' (-1.61) 
INDSEGS + 0.054 0.044 0.010 
(2.22)'' (2.36)" (0.34) 
FORPCT + 0.181 0.23 1 -0.050 
(1.11) (1.82)' (-.24) 
Adj R-Square 
N 
0.345 0.358 
540 540 
'Separate regression are provided for the pre- and post-SFAS 131 periods. The pre-SFAS 131 
period includes all annual observations of firms with year-ends from December 1997 to November 
1998. The post-SFAS 131 period includes all annual observations of firms with year-ends from De- 
cember 1999 to November 2000. 
bDISP equals the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts of earnings per share eight months 
before the end of year t ,  scaled by price at the time of the consensus forecast. NONDISC is an indica- 
tor variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for firms that do not disclose geographic earnings in the post- 
SFAS 131 period. LGMV is the log of market value. NUMEST is the number of analysts included in 
the consensus forecast eight months before the year-end. LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 (0 
otherwise) if actual earnings as reported by I/B/E/S are. less than zero. INDSEGS is the number indus- 
try segments reported by the firm. FORPCT is the percentage of annual foreign sales to total geo- 
graphic segment sales. 
'The significance of the difference in mean coefficients is tested using the typical F- 
test. *,**,*** Indicates significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively 
(t-statistics and F-statistics are shown in parentheses). 
the nondisclosure of geographic earnings is more (or less) likely to be detrimen- 
tal to the predictability of earnings. Below we provide a brief description of the 
subsets examined and the rationale for the test. 
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4.3.1 Change in the Number of Geographic Segments after Implementation 
of SFAS 131 
Firms are defined as increasing (not increasing) their number of geographic 
segments when the number of geographic segments in the post-SFAS 131 
increases by more than (less than or equal to) one relative to the number in the 
pre-SFAS 131 period. The loss of information from nondisclosure of geographic 
earnings could be offset by the increase in information related to an increase in 
the number of geographic segments. 
4.3.2 Change in the Number of Industry Segments after Implementation 
of SFAS 131 
Firms are defined as increasing (not increasing) their number of industry 
segments when the number of industry segments in the post-SFAS 131 period 
increases by more than (less than or equal to) one relative to the number in the 
pre-SFAS 13 1 period. The loss of information from nondisclosure of geographic 
earnings could be offset by the increase in information related to an increase in 
the number of industry segments. 
4.3.3 High versus Low Degree of Foreign Operations 
Firms with a high (low) degree of foreign operations are defined as those 
with a ratio of foreign sales to total geographic sales greater (less) than 40 per- 
cent. The sample median is approximately 32 percent. Disclosure of geographic 
earnings should increase in importance as the foreign operations of a MNC 
increases. 
4.3.4 Higher and Lower Growth in Foreign Sales 
Firms are defined as having high (low) growth in foreign sales if the per- 
centage change in foreign sales from the pre- to post-SFAS 131 period is greater 
(less) than 50 percent. The sample median is approximately 34 percent. Addi- 
tional information about foreign operations (e.g., geographic earnings) may be 
more important in predicting future results as MNCs expand their operations 
internationally. 
4.3.5 Large and Small Difference between Domestic and Foreign 
Profit Margins 
Firms are defined as having a large (small) difference between domestic and 
foreign profit margins (i.e., earnings divided by sales) when the absolute difference 
between the domestic profit margin and foreign profit margin in the pre-SFAS 131 
period is greater (less) than 5 percent. Investors and analysts may be able to derive 
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the approximate amount of geographic earnings using reported geographic sales if 
the company’s ratio of earnings to sales is relatively constant across operations. 
Geographic earnings will be harder to determine when the profitability of foreign 
operations differs considerably from that of domestic operations. 
4.3.6 High and Low Analyst Following 
Firms are defined as having high (low) analyst following when there are at 
least (fewer than) four analysts following the firm in the post-SFAS 131 period. 
The sample median is approximately three analysts. Firms with higher analyst 
following likely have a richer information environment because of information 
gathering and processing on the part of analysts from sources other than financial 
disclosures (e.g., conference calls with management). 
4.3.7 Large versus Small Firms 
Large (small) f i i s  are defined as those with sales greater (less) than $500 mil- 
lion in the post-SFAS 131 period. Disclosures made by smaller f i s  may be more 
important to investors and analysts in predicting earnings, as investors are more 
likely to obtain information on larger f m s  from a number of alternative sources. 
4.3.8 High and Low Risk 
Firms are defined as having high (low) risk if the market-to-book ratio is 
less (greater) than three in the post-SFAS 131 period. Financial disclosure may 
be especially important for riskier firms in reducing information asymmetry 
between the firm and financial statement users. 
For the 16 subsets of firms across the different tests of earnings predictabil- 
ity around the implementation of SFAS 131, we find no evidence consistent with 
nondisclosure of geographic earnings being related to changes in the predictabil- 
ity of MNCs’ earnings. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we attempt to understand what effect, if any, nondisclosure of 
geographic earnings upon implementation of SFAS 131 has on the predictability 
of MNCs’ earnings. SFAS 131 fundamentally changes the way in which firms 
report segment results compared with guidelines under SFAS 14. Firms are now 
required to report operating segment results according to the internal organization 
of the company. Companies that define operating segments on any basis other 
than geographic area (e.g., products or services) are no longer required to dis- 
close geographic earnings. Because geographic earnings have varying degrees of 
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volatility and expected growth, investors will no longer have access to an impor- 
tant piece of information useful for predicting a firm’s future performance. 
Contrary to expectations, we find that the FASB’s decision to no longer require 
disclosure of earnings for geographic segments does not result in lower earnings 
predictability for MNCs. To measure the predictability of earnings around imple- 
mentation of SFAS 131, we use analysts’ absolute forecast error and analysts’ fore- 
cast dispersion.” In each of these tests, we find that earnings predictability has not 
declined after implementation of SFAS 131 for firms that no longer disclose geo- 
graphic earnings, relative to f m s  that continue to disclose geographic earnings.12 
The insignificant results could occur for several reasons. First, investors and 
analysts may not use geographic earnings information in making their forecasts. 
SFAS 131 differs from other financial reporting standards in that f m s  are required 
to disclose only the information that they use it for internal reporting purposes. If 
geographic earnings are not disclosed, then the presumption could be that this infor- 
mation is not used internally. If managers do not find this information useful for in- 
ternal decision making, then investors and analysts might also deem this 
information to be unimportant. While the decisions of managers, investors, and ana- 
lysts may not align precisely, all parties are interested in predicting the results of 
future operations and therefore should use approximately the same information set. 
Second, the insignificant results could occur because geographic earnings 
disclosures under SFAS 131 are not useful. There is some debate as to whether 
geographic segment information reported under SFAS 13 1 represents an 
improvement in disclosure compared to that reported under SFAS 14. For exam- 
ple, SFAS 131 states that firms must disclose geographic information only for 
material countries. If amounts for particular countries are deemed immaterial by 
management, then foreign operations can be combined into a single “Total For- 
eign” segment. Under SFAS 14, firms commonly disclosed geographic segments 
for groups of countries or regions. While not preferable to single-country disclo- 
sures, the multi-country disclosures should provide more information than a 
“Total Foreign” segment di~closure.’~ Thus, the quality of geographic disclo- 
sures required under SFAS 131 may be inferior to that under SFAS 14. 
11. Our empirical tests do not control for changes in analysts’ private information around 
implementation of SFAS 131. As such, any policy implications from our use of observable forecast 
properties (i.e., error and dispersion) should be made with this caveat. 
12. The fact that we do not observe any effect from nondisclosure of geographic earnings could be 
caused by the fact that we examine the effect on total earnings predictability. It could be that such disclo- 
sures are particularly important for the predictability of earnings components such as the foreign compo- 
nent of total earnings (see Hope, Kang, Thomas, & Vasvari [2006]). Analysts’ forecasts are not, however, 
available separately for domestic and foreign earnings from commercial databases. Another possibility is 
that tests of forecast errors are not powerful enough to detect any differences among the two groups of 
firms. For example, Cready and Hurtt (2002) provide evidence that volume-based mebics provide very 
powerful tests of the effect of accounting information, and Hope, Thomas, and Winterbotham (2006) show 
that nondisclosure of geographic earnings is associated with lower trading volume. 
13. For example, Pepsico and ChevronTexaco generate approximately one-third and one-half, 
respectively, of their revenues from foreign operations. However, these companies disclose only reve- 
nues and long-lived assets for a domestic segment and a single international segment. 
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Third, sales and long-lived assets by geographic area continue to be required 
disclosures under SFAS 131, regardless of the firm’s definition of operating seg- 
ments. The marginal benefit to investors and analysts of also having geographic 
earnings disclosures may be minimal in forecasting future results. Prior research 
has shown that although geographic sales enhance the predictability of consoli- 
dated sales, the same is not always true for geographic earnings (Roberts [1989]; 
Herrmann [ 19961). If geographic earnings disclosures do not provide incremental 
information beyond other disclosures, then the FASB’s decision to no longer 
require disclosure is appropriate. 
Fourth, the lack of significance may be related to analysts not appropriately 
using this information. If analysts should have used the geographic earnings dis- 
closure but did not, then failure to disclose geographic earnings under SFAS 131 
will not impact analysts’ forecasts. This conclusion would be consistent with 
prior research showing that analysts do not fully adjust for the differential impli- 
cations of domestic and foreign earnings on future earnings (Khurana, Pereira, & 
Raman [2003]). 
Finally, we rely on analysts’ forecast properties as measures of earnings pre- 
dictability. These measures may provide biased or noisy measure of other users’ 
ability to predict earnings. As such, our results generalize to other user groups 
(e.g., investors) only to the extent that their expectations relate to analysts’ 
expectations. To compensate for the potential noise in analysts’ forecasts, we con- 
sider increasing the sample size by extending the pre- and post-SFAS 131 periods 
to three years (instead of one year) and using quarterly observations (instead of 
ann~a l ) . ’~  All conclusions remain, suggesting that lack of power does not explain 
the insignificant results. 
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